I have a premonition that some readers of the
present volume – especially my fellow academics, as well as some
divinity school students, ministers, and perhaps a few educated
laymen – will react to its main argument with a yawn. Such people
have grown used to the idea that the Bible really wasn’t written
by those figures long claimed to be its authors, that it is full
of contradictions and editorial overlays, etiological narratives
and invented history. “Yes, Virginia, there is no Santa Claus,”
they will say. “We are all a little older and wiser now, and some
of our old illusions have fallen away. But really, that’s not so
bad – in fact, it’s not bad at all. We embrace the truth about the
Bible as we now know it.”
I understand this reaction, but I don’t think it tells the whole
story. I have noticed that these same people, especially when it
comes to talking about actual texts – in biblical commentaries or
introductions to the Old Testament – are often not nearly as blasé
as their yawn might indicate (nor as committed to the “truth about
the Bible as we now know it”). On the contrary, what they have to
say often has an unmistakably apologetic tone: “Yes, it’s true,
modern scholars have shown X, but still…” Indeed, this “Yes, but
still…” way of talking about the Bible is so common nowadays it
might practically be described as a reflex, a built-in or automatic
way of trying to downplay the results of modern scholarship (yielding
what might be called “Biblical Criticism Lite”) and thereby minimizing
its implications.
So, as we have seen, the Bible’s Flood story is nowadays generally
held to be a recasting of an ancient Mesopotamian legend – one that
even retains some of the original wording (“smelled the pleasing
odor” and so forth) of the text from which it was copied. A commentator
who had truly made his or her peace with modern scholarship would
point out these resemblances and leave it at that. But time and
time again, what commentators actually do is go on to stress
how
unlike its Mesopotamian model is the biblical version:
When one compares the biblical story [of the Flood] with the Gilgamesh
Epic, great differences leap to attention. To be sure, this account
too has naïve anthropomorphic touches, like the statement that YHWH
shut the door of the Ark (Gen. 7:16b), or that YHWH smelled the
pleasing fragrance of Noah’s sacrifice (9:12). But these details,
inherited from the popular tradition, do not obscure the central
view that YHWH, the sole God (in contrast to Babylonia’s many gods),
acts in human affairs in a meaningful and consistent way (in contrast
to the caprice of the Babylonian deities).
[1]
Similarly:
Throughout the flood story, then, Genesis paints a completely different
portrait of God from the standard ancient theology [of Mesopotamia].
Most obviously, there is only one God. This means that all power
belongs to him: it is not shared out unequally among different members
of a pantheon. But just as important is the character of the divinity
revealed by the flood story. He is still personal: anthropomorphic
language is freely used to describe God’s thoughts and attitudes.
But the failings that too often characterize humanity and the Babylonian
deities are eliminated. God is not fearful, ignorant, greedy, or
jealous. He is not annoyed by man’s rowdiness, but by his depravity.
Not partiality but justice dictates the salvation of Noah.
[2]
Likewise:
In the
Epic of Gilgamesh there is recognition that humanity
has committed misdeeds worthy of retribution, but the Babylonian
version does not reflect the moral outrage found in Genesis. Also,
we can turn to another Mesopotamian tale,
Atrahasis, in which
the god Enlil initiates a campaign of terror against the human family
because its prodigious growth has created a noise too loud to tolerate.
After repeated forays of plague and famine, Enlil undertakes a cataclysmic
flood. Genesis, on the other hand, shows that God is not inconvenienced
by human achievement; human achievement is, on the contrary, the
consequence of his bountiful blessing. Rather, he acts in accord
with ethical demands, agitated only by the wicked gains cooperate
depravity has mounted.
[3].
And yet again:
[Israel’s] version, therefore, for all the tangible connections
here and there, is as different from the whole [Mesopotamian] story
as possible. The Babylonian version, along with many poetic merits,
shows a very crude, polytheistic conception of God.
[4]
My purpose is not to ask whether these assertions are really true,
but why commentators so consistently feel called upon to make them.
The answer is obvious. They feel torn between what they would like
the Bible to be – an utterly unique, divinely inspired book given
to mankind – and what modern scholarship has sought to show about
this particular story, that it is essentially copied from a Mesopotamian
source (and therefore
not, on the face of things, an utterly
unique, divinely inspired composition). So there
has to be
a world of difference between the biblical and Mesopotamian versions
despite the obvious similarities. The differences commentators fix
on, however, are really not very convincing. Thus, these scholars
are fudging a bit when they imply that part of the biblical tale’s
uplifting message is that YHWH is the “sole God.” In its recasting
of this story, the Bible may have changed “the gods” to God (it
would certainly have been surprising if it had not), but there is
actually nothing in the narrative that asserts that He is the only
God in the world. Monotheism is simply not part of this story’s
concerns. Moreover, the claim that God in this tale “acts in human
affairs in a meaningful and consistent way” seems odd – what, by
first deciding to create humanity and then deciding to destroy it?
[5]
We have seen a number of stories in Genesis in which the biblical
hero acts rather unheroically, even unethically. And why
should
the hero be a moral exemplar? Everything scholars have learned about
these tales indicates that they often were etiological in nature
– certainly they were not originally intended as lessons in ethics.
They acquired that status only thanks to the ancient interpreters.
But once a Bible always a Bible, so many otherwise hard-nosed commentaries
seek somehow to preserve the high moral standing of the main figures
in Genesis even in the most dubious cases.
One such instance is the narrative in which Jacob gets his brother
Esau to sell him his birthright for a bowl of stew. For modern scholars,
this is an etiological narrative designed to explain how the “younger
brother” Israel came to dominate its once more powerful neighbor
Edom. Yet that hardly sits well with the old idea of the Bible as
a book replete with moral instruction, in which figures like Jacob
are necessarily models of ethical probity. So, at least in a great
many modern commentaries and introductions, the etiological side
of things is down-played as the commentator desperately seeks to
save Jacob’s reputation:
Esau parts with the birthright. – The superiority of Israel
to Edom is popularly explained by a typical incident, familiar to
the pastoral tribes bordering on the desert, where the wild huntsman
would come famishing to the shepherd’s tent to beg for a morsel
of food. At such times the ‘man of the field’ is at the mercy of
the tent-dweller; and the ordinary Israelite would see nothing immoral
in a transaction like this, where the advantage is pressed to the
uttermost.
[6]
Here, one cannot but notice the delicately worded heading, “Esau
parts with his birthright,” along with the (quite unsupported)
assertion that this was a “typical incident” in ancient times. Note
also the implied description of Esau as “wild,” and the insinuation
that Jacob was a shepherd – neither of these has any basis in this
biblical narrative itself. Finally, the commentator’s observation
that “an ordinary Israelite” would see nothing immoral in Jacob’s
behavior is meant to argue against our own, unavoidable impression
that Jacob was indeed doing something worthy of condemnation.
Another commentator sums up the episode thus:
Esau, slave of his appetites, fell into Jacob’s trap like a hungry
bird.
[7]
I suppose every starving person might be described as a slave of
his appetites, but what exactly was Jacob’s “trap”? There is no
indication that he planned to cook up his lentils so as to tempt
Esau, only that he cruelly withheld them after Esau showed up until
Esau would agree to the deal. Yet another scholar opines:
The purpose of the action is to illustrate the superiority of the
younger brother, who is astute and farsighted. Esau’s words and
actions are a deliberate caricature: he is uncouth, coarse, and
stupid. Jacob, on the contrary, is farsighted; he thinks of the
future and is determined to rise in the world.
[8]
Talk about apologetics: Phew!
The Bible is not here condoning what has been obtained by trickery.
On the contrary, the way the narrative is handled makes clear that
Jacob has a claim on the birthright wholly and solely by virtue
of God’s predetermination. In the other words, the presence of the
oracle in the story [in Gen. 25:23] constitutes, in effect, a moral
judgment upon Jacob’s behavior.
[9]
Here, at least, the commentator is prepared to accept that Jacob
behaved unethically (though again, it was not so much by “trickery”
as by exploitation). But he goes on to say what the biblical text
does not even imply, that Jacob’s
real claim to his brother’s
birthright comes “wholly and solely by virtue of God’s predetermination”
as expressed in Gen. 25:23. On the contrary, what this story says
is that Jacob
officially acquired his brother’s birthright
thanks to Esau’s sale of it in extreme circumstances. That’s why
Jacob makes Esau
take an oath, to make it official. The rest
is just the commentator’s wishful thinking; there is no hint of
any “moral judgment upon Jacob’s behavior” in the story itself.
The same apologetic mode characterizes modern scholars’ handling
of an earlier incident, in which Abraham tells his wife to say she
is his sister in order to save his own neck. About this story one
commentator opines:
It is impossible for God to make of Abram a great nation if Abram
is dead before he fathers one child. How can God give Canaan to
Abram’s seed if he has no seed? To prevent such a possibility, Abram
must do all he can to stay alive. He is giving YHWH a little assistance
in a potentially embarrassing situation!
[10]
In other words, Abraham wasn’t really being cowardly, he was just
trying to help God out. But why should this commentator, and others,
[11]
feel compelled to apologize for Abraham’s behavior when the biblical
text so clearly does not? On the contrary, it seems to glory in
the success of his deception.
Moving on: does the narrative in the book of Exodus play fast and
loose with the facts, asserting all kinds of things that modern
scholars have found to be untrue?
That Israel’s faith encouraged a broad freedom in the handling of
history in these stories is owing to nothing else so much as a passion
for conveying the wonder of the Exodus itself. Methodically and
purposefully, each episode sustains the tension as it build to its
climax.
[12]
Has modern feminist scholarship revealed the Bible to be a fundamentally
patriarchal document, riddled with sexism and female stereotypes?
Look a little deeper:
This [the story of Rahab the harlot, Josh. 2:1-21] is a tale of
a woman who is both cunning trickster, securing her family’s future,
and praiseworthy host, protecting her endangered guests in accordance
with ancient norms of hospitality. In the midst of the virile game
of war, with its masculine adventures in espionage, one woman seizes
opportunity from the jaws of crisis and, by a shrewd and assertive
use of the unusual freedom offered by her unenviable profession,
saves both herself and her family. She traps and pressures these
young spies to extract what she wants: life and a future. Rahab
acts wisely because she perceptively discerns the deeper truth of
the situation.
[13]
From a relatively early time, some researchers suggested that the
Deutero-Isaiah’s references to the suffering “servant of the Lord”
cannot reasonably be taken as prophecies about Jesus (even though
they are explained as such in the Gospels). But this was a hard
pill for many Christian commentators to swallow. So, while not arguing
the Jesus connection directly, many sought to assert that these
passage were somehow special, different from the rest of the book
of Isaiah. Christened the “Servant Songs” (though truly, there was
nothing songlike about them!), they were alleged to have been composed
quite separately from their surrounding texts:
[14]
The[se] songs represent a special strand within the book of Deutero-Isaiah,
and therefore they did not come into being at the same time as their
contexts. Nevertheless, they owe their origin to Deutero-Isaiah.
[15]
They are marked out not only by a special theme, independent from
that of the rest of the work, but also but the fact that they have
evidently been interpolated in their present context, from which
they can be removed without any resultant damage or interruption.
[16]
The text itself offers no real support for such assertions, and
most scholars have now come to reject them.
[17]
Understandably, however, it is still hard for some to let go completely.
Thus, even while denying any specific connection to Jesus, commentators
have continued to see the “servant of the Lord” as a messianic figure
[18]
– though again, the text offers no support for this – or at least
to evoke the suffering of Jesus and his crucifixion in the process
of commenting on Isa. 52:13-53:12.
[19]
As the very last of apologetic options, the identity of the “servant
of the Lord” is alleged to be one of Scripture’s great mysteries:
The poems are concerned with a particular figure (historical or
metaphorical?), but the identity of that figure is completely enigmatic…It
is fair to say that although interpretation is completely bewildered
by the specificity of the text that we simply do not understand,
at the same time the broad thematic outlines of the text are enormously
suggestive and continue to be generative of interpretation.
[20]
Clear and concise though the song is, its interpretation is very
difficult. On three matters we are left in the dark. Who is the
servant here designated by God for a task? What is the nature of
the task? And in what context is the designation made? Exegesis
must never ignore the limits thus put upon it. The cryptic, veiled
language used is deliberate. This is true of every one of the servant
songs alike. From the very outset there must be no idea that exegesis
can clear up all their problems.
[21]
It is true that the references to the “servant of the Lord” in the
latter part of the book of Isaiah are somewhat inconsistent, sometimes
implying that he is a metaphorical representation of Israel as a
whole, sometimes a
pars pro toto, sometimes the book’s speaker
himself. But there are a lot of inconsistencies in Scripture, and
even a lot of unidentified figures. Does not the insistence on this
one’s “cryptic” and “enigmatic” nature arise from a desire, unconscious
perhaps, to single him out because of the role he used to play in
Christian exegesis – indeed, even to hold out the hope that his
very mysteriousness will leave enough room for him somehow, despite
everything scholars have come to know, to be reconnected to the
Good News of Christianity?
For the most part, prophetic texts have retained their capacity
to speak to modern readers without interpretive apology: their denunciations
of immorality and hypocrisy, along with their call for people to
care for society’s weakest members, address us as clearly today
as they did Israelites two and half millennia ago. No wonder that
the words of Amos and Isaiah, Jeremiah and Deutero-Isaiah tend to
feature prominently in sermons and other public forums. But even
here there are problems. As we have seen, one popular prophetic
genre was the so-called “oracle against the nations” (OAN), in which
the prophet denounces one or several of ancient Israel’s neighbors
and forecasts their imminent downfall. Understandably, such passages
tend not to be featured in sermons; they are not, we like to think,
part of the prophet’s
true message. But aren’t they? Here
the historian and the preacher often part ways, if only through
the latter’s selective filtering of the text. But even a scholar
doing his best to report on the reality of the biblical world may,
confronted with such passages, sometimes slip into the apologetic
mode:
The book [of Obadiah] has often been criticized for vindictiveness,
but the association of justice with vengeance is found throughout
the Old Testament and especially in the prophetic corpus. If Obadiah
seems especially vindictive, this is due to the brevity of the book,
which allows this theme to dominate to an unusual degree. The desire
for vengeance was not unprovoked. The underlying assumption is that
one people should not exploit the misfortune of another, and that
such exploitation is especially heinous in the case of neighbors
and relatives.
[22]
Obvious borrowings from ancient Near Eastern literature, etiological
tales devoid of any ethical message, sexism, bloodthirsty denigrations
of foreigners, anonymous prophecies utterly disconnected from the
New Testament – none of these has been particularly comforting to
modern scholars. Surprisingly, however, scholars do not usually
tread lightly over such passages; rather, they hone in on them in
order to claim that they are at least somewhat other than what they
might seem – basically ethical, egalitarian, and perhaps even a
little Christian. That is to say, they feel drawn to apologize.
Apologetics are a sign of an underlying anxiety. The anxiety in
this case derives from the inescapable fact that, in the light of
all that modern scholarship has discovered, the Bible necessarily
looks very different from the way it looked only a century or so
ago. Yet these commentators still want it to be the Bible in the
old sense – divinely inspired (at least in some attenuated way),
a guide to proper conduct and proper beliefs, a book of truth and
not falsehood, as free of error and internal contradiction as possible,
in short, despite everything they know, a book still worthy of being
called the Word of God. Their repeatedly apologetic remarks give
the lie, I think, to the claim that people schooled in modern scholarship,
even those at the forefront of biblical research, have entirely
made their peace with its implications. They may sometimes sound
blasé, but the truth, it seems to me, is that most of them are simply
doing the best they can to have it both ways, to have their Bible
and criticize it too.
Biblical Theology
One area in which apologetics have played a special role is in extended
treatments of biblical theology, or, in the present instance, what
is called Old Testament theology. Back in the days before modern
scholarship, the Bible was just held to be true in all of its details:
open it up and you could find out what to think and do. In practice,
however, much of the heavy lifting was done through a series of
Christian creeds, which set out in precise, schematic form what
a person was actually to believe. Even after the rise of Protestantism,
some of these creeds survived in different denominations, but the
doctrine of
sola Scriptura diminished their importance and
laid upon Scripture much of the task of providing Protestants with
guidance in matters of faith.
It did not take long for critical scholars to see that the Bible
often does
not speak with one voice. Certainly the New Testament’s
teachings were different from the Old’s, but even the Old Testament
was not always consistent. Various parts disagreed with one another,
either because they were written at different times or because they
came from different authors (often representing different schools
or social strata) who had conflicting interests and agendas. If
so, then what
was a person to believe – what E says about
vicarious punishment or what Ezekiel says? After a while, scholars
also came to view the Bible’s history-writing as unreliable, as
“what really happened” was shown again and again to be at variance
with the biblical record. For such reasons, starting in the late
eighteenth century, the task of theologians began to change.
[23]
Now, part of their job was to isolate the basic ideas and concepts
in different parts of the Bible and study them separately and in
comparison to one another (this was called “
biblical theology”).
The results of this effort might then serve as the raw material
for religious thinkers to use in creating a somewhat Bible-based
set of teachings for the modern world (dogmatic theology). In the
process, of course, one might conveniently dispose of anything obviously
untrue or ideologically unacceptable, separating out such extraneous
material from the “main” concepts of various biblical writers.
[24]
It was no longer the Bible itself that spoke to moderns, but the
theological rewrite thereof.
This is not the place for a review of the history of biblical theology
over the past two centuries. But I do not think it would be much
of an exaggeration to say that at least part of that history has
involved great efforts on the part of theologians to save the Bible
from itself, that is, to save its old role as a source of divine
teachings from everything scholars now know about what it once meant
and how it came into existence. In particular, the act of selecting
some ideas or laws or institutions as theologically significant
has always helped to save the Bible from all the other things that
scholars were learning about it.
From Wellhausen on, students of Israelite religion have thought
of it in evolutionary terms: it started off as primitive, Wellhausen
said, perhaps animistic, and then evolved into the lofty religion
of the prophets before descending into priestly ceremony and Jewish
legalism. This scheme soon left its mark on biblical theology, but
here the trajectory was perforce somewhat different, since Christian
theologians sought to view Christianity itself as the completion
and natural end-point of Israel’s religion. Things could not start
down, go up, and then come down again. Instead, the task of Old
Testament theology became, for some, tracing the stages and main
ideas of the Old Testament that prepared the way for Christianity.
Again, this task was made easier by the very mix-and-match nature
of the undertaking; anything that was incompatible with Christianity
was, by definition, able to be rejected in the developmental scheme.
Here surely was an apologetic opportunity of enormous potential,
and one that has been fully exploited over the last century.
Along somewhat similar lines, numerous theologians have sought to
identify the basic message of the Old Testament with a single, overriding
theme, sometimes called the Old Testament’s theological “center.”
[25]
That theme was at first held to be monotheism itself,
[26]
but later, other possibilities were substituted: the idea of a divine
covenant between man and God; God’s “lordship”; God’s holiness;
God’s choice of Israel as His people; and yet others. The very idea
of such a mega-theme might, in its own way, serve a “Yes, but still…”
approach: modern scholarship may have uncovered some cracks and
breaks in the Bible’s walls, but still, there was no denying the
great message that emerged despite these discouraging details.
One great theme made popular in America in the twentieth century
was that of God’s saving acts in history.
[27]
Influenced by Albright and his students, theologians saw the Bible
as the record of a unique people who, having cast their lot with
an equally unique deity, entered Canaan as outsiders. (Here again,
it was the events behind the text that were important; what the
Bible said was just the starting point.) The Hebrew Bible was thus
essentially the record of the Israelites’ new faith pitting them
against the very different norms of their neighbors. Theologians
therefore highlighted the great gap that separated Israel from its
broader environment: the egalitarianism of its laws and social ethos;
its unique sense of history as opposed to timeless myth;
[28]
prophecy as a uniquely Israelite institution, and the relationship
between God and man upon which it is predicated; the Bible’s absolute
condemnation of magic, necromancy, and the like, as opposed to their
place of honor in other ancient religions; and others. (This
sharp discontinuity between Israel and its neighbors also held an
obvious message for today.
Go and do thou likewise, it said;
stand up for your own religious values in the face of modern society.)
This approach also involved a certain amount of apologetic interpretation,
and it eventually ran into trouble when scholarship began to call
into question the version of Israelite history on which it was based
(in particular, the historicity of the exodus and conquest narratives)
as well as, one by one, the allegedly unique aspects of biblical
Israel.
[29]
As scholars wrestled with the Bible’s internal inconsistencies,
apparent errors, exaggerations, and similar flaws, theologians felt
themselves called upon to articulate afresh the crucial concept
of the divine inspiration of Scripture. As noted in chapter 36,
various sorts of inspiration were now distinguished, and these too
had an apologetic ring: “limited verbal inspiration,” “non-textual
inspiration,” “content inspiration,” “inspired experiences,” “social
inspiration,” and so forth.
[30]
By the same token, Scriptural “infallibility” was distinguished
from Scriptural “inerrancy,” and both of these were found to be
different from the “essential truth” of Scripture, which emerged
despite its human authors and their many errors. To give these various
positions a proper treatment would, however, take us far afield.
Seeking to apologize for the Bible in the face of modern scholarship’s
disturbing findings is, no doubt, a natural reaction. It derives,
as was said earlier, from the desire of some scholars to “have their
Bible and criticize it too.” But if one considers biblical theology
at some distance, what is striking is that, for the most part, modern
scholarship has not led theologians to question the whole enterprise
of speaking about the Bible as if it were a religiously authoritative
document. Why not? After all, why should someone who, in his or
her heart, feels that all the Bible’s accounts of miraculous events
are actually the result of primitive superstitions or delusions
under stress or, still worse, conscious attempts to deceive – why
should such a person nevertheless look to the authors of these very
accounts as people who can offer valid insights into the nature
of God or His ways with mankind? And how can someone who holds that
much of biblical history was originally created as political propaganda,
propaganda that consciously sought to conceal the seamy doings of
extortionists, racketeers, and the engineers of political
Putsche
(not infrequently referring to God’s role in the process!)
–
how can such a person nonetheless turn to this same history for
teachings about divinely ordained morality and justice? Similar
questions could be asked about the writings of other figures – prophets,
sages, and psalmists – whose motives, historical circumstances,
and formulaic rhetoric have also been investigated by modern scholarship.
Ought these writings still to be considered a valid source of theological
instruction
ex officio? “The Bible is still the Bible” is
the answer one hears, or “Listen for the word of God” – but why?
By force of habit? Because there is no choice? This is a question
not often addressed.
Literary Criticism of the Bible
Apologetics have also tinged another modern method of analyzing
Scripture, today’s “literary” approach to biblical texts. Unbeknownst
to some of its current practitioners, this approach actually has
deep roots, going back to antiquity and various early Christian
thinkers.
[31]
Indeed, the same approach to biblical texts was carried forward
and developed on into the high Middle Ages. With the rise of modern
scholarship, however, it went underground for a time: indeed,
Literarkritik
was used in German (and sometimes still is) to designate Wellhausenian
source criticism, and in English “the Bible as Literature” was actually
a kind of code-word for any scholarly, critical approach to the
biblical text – it had nothing specifically literary about it.
[32]
But the truly literary approach was never quite dead (witness Lowth
and Herder) and, especially over the past half-century, self-consciously
approaching biblical texts
as literature had enjoyed a surprising
comeback.
One reason for this comeback has been the literary approach’s ability
to neutralize some of the more noxious effects of modern scholarship.
“We are not interested in the historical background of the text,”
say the modern literary critics, “nor even whether it was written
by one author or four. What matters is the finished product, the
text itself. So, just as it doesn’t matter to me what was happening
in Wordsworth’s life when he wrote the
Lyrical Ballads or
whether the
Iliad is the work of a single poet, I really
don’t care what lies behind the Bible. Like Wordsworth’s poetry
or the
Iliad, the Bible is simply great literature – and
this fact is not affected by what modern biblical scholars say about
its origins and historical background or historicity.” With this
approach,
[33]
all the troubling conclusions about composite authorship, editorial
interpolations, and even “original meaning” can be put aside.
[34]
The modern literary critic is not against them in principle (and
certainly not on theological grounds), it’s just that they are basically
irrelevant to someone whose focus is resolutely on the text we have
in front of us today.
I should note – though it is hardly my main point here – that such
an approach to an obviously multi-layered, multi-authored text is
actually altogether at odds with what real literary critics seek
to do. Confronted with the phenomenon of a text that has undergone
editing by a foreign hand – say, Max Brod’s editing of Kafka – the
literary critic’s first reaction is naturally to try to understand
how the text got into its present form and what actually can be
reasonably attributed to the author himself. The clearest
literary
example known to me of a kind of multiple authorship comparable
to that attributed to the Pentateuch is the medieval French
Roman
de la Rose. This curious text was begun in the early thirteenth
century by Guillaume de Lorris, an author enamored of medieval allegory.
He produced a highly allegorical poem, with characters labeled “Happiness,”
“Danger,” “Mirth,” and so forth, all interacting with one another
in a symbolic bower of bliss. But de Lorris died before he could
finish his work, and – for reasons not entirely clear – his pen
was taken up by a second man, Jean de Meun, about forty years later.
Then something extraordinary happened. Jean de Meun was not particularly
taken by allegory, but he was quite interested in philosophy and
high ideas, while at the same time a great storyteller, at times
tender, at times a bit bawdy. If this sounds a bit Chaucer, perhaps
it is no accident; Chaucer was a great admirer of Jean de Meun,
and his style in English bears an uncanny resemblance to de Meun’s
medieval French. (Indeed, Chaucer is thought to be the, or a, translator
of the
Roman into Middle English.) Jean de Meun thus took
up de Lorris’ characters, but turned them from stick figures into
real people, with their own emotions, obsessions, and other quirks
of character. Despite the marked differences in the two authors’
styles and approaches, the combined de Lorris-de Meun work circulated
for a long as if a unified work. Once scholars became aware of its
dual authorship, however, they reacted in a way exactly opposite
to many literary critics of the Bible; they thought it as crucial
to understand each author’s work separately, in isolation, even
if, at times, it was interesting as well to see how the later writer’s
creations echoed, took up the thread of, but also drastically modified
the earlier writer’s poem. In the end, it should be said, decent
literary criticism is never concerned merely with the decorative,
the “artistry” part of the text. It is about
meaning, about
making sense of a human artifact, and will hardly fly from any information
that can make its understanding more profound.
It would be wrong to suggest that the popularity of the literary
approach in recent years has come about solely for apologetic reasons.
Certainly today’s literary critics have often written in enlightening
ways about the final form of the text. But what seems to me problematic
about the literary approach is that it regularly ends up implying
that that final form of the Bible is something that, in fact, it
never was,
literature in the same sense that the writings
of Boccaccio or Goethe or Pushkin or Balzac are literature. As we
have seen, there is no way to approach any text without some assumptions
about what sort of a piece of writing it is (or, in literary jargon,
what its genre is) and, consequently, what conventions it obeys
and how it is to be understood.
There is no “default” position
here, no primary or “natural” way of reading from which all
other ways are a deviation. I read a business letter one way and
a poem another; I could go looking for rhyme or alliteration or
even allegory in the warranty that came with my clock-radio, and,
if the text is long enough, no doubt I could find them.
[35]
But this would still be completely inappropriate to the genre
of clock-radio warranties. So even if I could wave my wand and forget
about J, E, P, H and D, dismissing them as if they were a single
author’s preliminary drafts and focusing only on the book of Genesis
as it now is, nevertheless, that would not turn it in to
literature
unless I were prepared to assume something about its genre that
is largely inappropriate. Neither the original authors nor the final
editors and canonizers of Genesis were out to create
literature
of the Boccaccio kind; even to compare the stories of Genesis
to their rewriting in
Paradise Lost would be a bit off. In
the beginning, most of Genesis was to be understood as a series
of etiological explanations of the present, while for its canonizers
Genesis was part of a great divine guidebook. Of course, any story
has a beginning, a middle, and an end, and any literary critic can
therefore trace its humble or majestic “narrative poetics.” But
doing so inevitably implies something about what the Bible is and
why we read it that, on reflection, really isn’t true.
[36]
The literary approach holds a particular appeal for avowed secularists
as well as the disillusioned consumers of modern biblical scholarship.
“Despite all the things we don’t believe anymore,” they say, “there
is still good reason for the Bible’s place of honor in our culture.
It’s great literature!” This is not utterly false: the story of
Joseph has a good plot; David is artfully limned. But from there
to claiming that the Bible is Number One because of its literary
qualities – puh-leeze! If its literary merit were the reason why
we read it, surely the Good Book would have been swapped long ago
for Dante and Shakespeare and Milton, Goethe and Dostoevsky and
James Joyce. To compare the Bible’s artistic qualities to those
of these authors is to compare the little tunes played on a shepherd’s
pipe to the mighty sound of a symphony orchestra. Ultimately, this
is just another form of apologetic, an attempt to save something
special about Scripture in an unbelieving world.
Strange to tell, while many of today’s literary critics of the Bible
are avowed secularists, their writings sometimes hold a particular
appeal for people of rather conservative religious beliefs, Christians
or Jews eager to celebrate the Bible’s merits. For them, its selling
point lies not only in its capacity to push aside modern scholarship,
but as well in its attribution to Scripture of a kind of artistry
and design bordering on the miraculous, something that only “the
great novelist in the Lord” (as Norman Mailer once put it) would
be capable of composing. It might seem unfair to compare the appeal
of this approach to that of a truly crackpot domain, the discovery
of secret “codes” in the Bible that are held to have predicted various
historical events.
[37]
What both have in common, however, is their ability to convince
ordinary readers, at least those eager to be convinced, that there
still is something special, indeed, something deeply hidden or infinitely
complicated about the Bible that fully reflects its divine origins.
So, religious readers may be spotted in the admiring throng as literary
critics offer up complicated diagrams showing the incredibly complex
symmetry of the story of the Tower of Babel
[38]
or the Jacob cycle,
[39]
or the heretofore unnoticed repetition of a crucial thematic
Leitwort
(“key word”) in the Elijah-Elisha stories. (The diagrams are indeed
symmetrical, but the texts themselves often less so;
[40]
the
Leitwort, alas, often turns out to be “go,”
[41]
“all,”
[42]
“people”
[43]
or some other common term, which might be located with equal frequency
in a paragraph of Samuelson’s
Economics. Sad to say, one
cannot escape the impression that beauty here is often solely in
the eye of the pious beholder.)
[44]
The View from Nowhere
Beyond all these is one more, somewhat less obvious, apologetic
aspect to today’s literary criticism of the Bible. Such criticism
is quite often predicated on what, in another context, has been
called “The View from Nowhere.”
[45]
That is, today’s literary critics offer highly sophisticated arguments
about the subtleties of this or that part of the Bible, but if you
were to ask them who it was who created the subtleties, they have
no plausible answer to offer, since the aims and methods of these
same biblical authors or redactors must be found elsewhere to be
(at least if these critics are honest) quite at odds with the aims
and methods implied by their literary analysis. So these wonderful
literary subtleties just
are; they came from nowhere at all.
Let one example stand for many:
Numerous scholars have observed that the story of Judah and Tamar
(Genesis 38) doesn’t seem to belong in its present location. It
interrupts the story of Joseph (which begins in Genesis 37 and then
resumes in Genesis 39) and has no apparent connection to it. This
notwithstanding, a few recent scholars have suggested that the story’s
insertion was not the act of a mindless redactor, but a deft move
by someone who established, or at least saw, a number of subtle
connections between the Joseph saga and the Judah-Tamar episode.
[46]
For example: Judah-Tamar begins with the statement that Judah “went
down” from his brothers to Adullam, whereas Joseph is said to have
been “taken down” (same verbal root,
yrd) to Egypt; both
stories feature the unusual phrase
hakker-na (“Recognize!”
in Gen. 37:32 and 38:25); in both stories, “articles of attire”
are used for deception – twice in the Joseph story (Joseph’s ornamented
coat is used to deceive Jacob, and his garment is used by Potiphar’s
wife to deceive) and once in Judah-Tamar (Tamar takes Judah’s seal,
cord, and staff to deceive him). On a deeper level, Judah’s actions
in Judah-Tamar are motivated by his fear of losing yet another son,
just as Jacob is reluctant to send Benjamin down to Egypt because
of
his fear of losing another son (since he believes Joseph
is dead). And both stories legitimate the emergence of a younger
son’s tribe as the leader of a kingdom.
This
is an impressive set of correspondences, although some
reservations are in order. To begin with, the highland country of
Judah and Israel is precisely that,
high; movement from it
to somewhere else is thus inevitably described with the verbal root
yrd, in dozens and dozens of other places quite unrelated
to these two stories. As for
hakker-na (“Recognize!”),
hakker
is the common biblical Hebrew word for “recognize,” and in both
cases the verb is, more precisely, a summons to
reluctant
recognition; it is hardly surprising the same expression should
be used in both. As for the deceptive use of “articles of attire,”
this argument works only if one accepts the dubious premise that
a seal, a cord, and a staff are indeed articles of attire. But none
of these is my point here. Let us stipulate that these are indeed
striking points of resemblance between the two stories. Who is responsible
for them?
For ancient interpreters, this question had a ready answer: the
divinely inspired author of the unitary book of Genesis.
Of course
such resemblances exist, they would say – the same person wrote
every word of both and he, or at least God, obviously intended these
connections. But this argument won’t work for modern scholars. For
them the story of Judah and Tamar is evidently an etiological tale
that circulated on its own before being inserted in its present
location; its original author could have known nothing about where
it would eventually end up in the Bible. Nor, by the same argument,
could the original author of the Joseph story have known that the
Judah-Tamar episode would end up being inserted in the middle of
his narrative. If he had, he probably would not have been
too happy about the idea, since, as virtually every commentator
since late antiquity has noted, the Judah-Tamar tale interrupts
the narrative flow and breaks the symmetry of the Joseph story.
What is more,
its Judah is something of an inconsiderate
lout who is ultimately put to shame by his cleverer daughter-in-law,
whereas the Judah of the Joseph story is its ultimate hero, the
brother who willingly sacrifices himself rather than causing pain
to his father. No, “Keep that tale separate from mine” is what the
author of the Joseph story would have said. And certainly the awkwardness
of its insertion – with nothing more than the introductory phrase
“At that time…” – is not at all characteristic of the author of
the Joseph narrative, universally recognized as the most skillful
story-teller in Genesis.
Who, then, was responsible for the striking resemblances between
the two stories? The only remaining candidate is the redactor, the
person who did actually insert one story inside the other. Now,
no one, I believe, is arguing that this redactor went so far as
to change the text of one or both stories to make them fit together
better – he didn’t, for example, insert the words “Recognize!” or
“went down” in one or both, or change the plot of Judah-Tamar to
make Judah, like Jacob in the Joseph story, worried about losing
another son (what could the story have been before such a change?)
No, the redactor changed nothing on his own, but his choice to insert
the Judah-Tamar episode where he did was nonetheless the decision
of someone “who recognized both verbal and thematic affinities between
the [two] stories.”
[47]
Did he really? This seems to me most unlikely. Everything scholars
know about this redactor indicates that his highest priority was
to preserve all surviving traditions about Israel’s ancestors and
organize them into a single, chronologically ordered history, the
book of Genesis; he did not care very much about the resulting subtle
or not-so-subtle resemblances between one episode and the next in
this history. He was not too troubled, for example, by the fact
that his history had Abraham passing off Sarah as his sister twice
in quite separate, but oddly similar, episodes (Genesis 12 and 20)
and Isaac acting likewise in yet a third (Genesis 26). He didn’t
seem to mind the numerous other doublets that modern scholars have
catalogued – the double banishment of Hagar (Genesis 16 and 21),
the double naming of Beer Sheba (Genesis 21 and 26) or of Jacob
(Genesis 32 and 35), and so on and so forth. Did he even notice
that Cain – whose name, on the face of things, indicated that he
was the ancestor of the Kenites – was, thanks to his (the redactor’s)
placement of the story, to be killed off with all of his descendants
in Noah’s flood, thus leaving the post-flood Kenites with no ancestry
in his history? To say that the far less obvious connections between
Judah-Tamar and the Joseph story had some role in this editor’s
decision to incorporate the former story into the latter, and in
the precise spot he did, strains all credibility.
Here is another, more simple-minded explanation. This editor was
in possession of the story of Judah and Tamar and wished to include
it (a valuable, if somewhat derogatory, glimpse of one of Israel’s
patriarchs) in his great history. He couldn’t place it before the
start of the Joseph story – the latter opens with Judah as still
a young man, shepherding the family flocks like an obedient son,
whereas in Judah-Tamar he is the father of grown children, indeed,
a grandfather at the end of the story. Thus, one could hardly go
from the Judah-Tamar episode to the
beginning of the Joseph
story. Nor could the redactor place Judah-Tamar at the end of the
Joseph story, since at the end of that tale Judah and his brothers
have taken up residence in Egypt, whereas Judah-Tamar requires Judah
still to be resident of Canaan. The only choice was for the redactor
to stick Judah-Tamar somewhere in the middle of the Joseph story,
which he did, choosing a natural break in the narrative and appending
to its beginning the rather lame transitional phrase, “At that time…”
If so, then who is responsible for all those marvelous points of
connection between the two stories, “Recognize!” and “went down”
and articles-of-clothing-used-to-deceive? When I was an undergraduate,
such questions used to be ruled out of bounds: the literary text
just
was, and speculating about whether the author had actually
intended this or that effect was called, in a famous essay by William
Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy.”
[48]
But that essay was itself fallacious, since it assumed that there
was just one standard way of approaching a text, one set of assumptions
that all readers brought to the act of reading. In the case of the
Bible, as we have seen, the assumptions one brings to the text are
crucial to its meaning. Ancient interpreters operated on the assumption
that Genesis (along with the rest of the Bible) was the flawless
product of divine inspiration, whereas modern interpreters generally
assume that Genesis is an anthology riddled with doublets and other
indications that its editor(s) cared little for consistency or subtle
relationships among its constituent parts. Yet modern literary scholars
of the Bible, though they usually act as if they belong to this
second group, often disregard this assumption in presenting their
literary analyses: no subtlety is too subtle and no finesse to fine
for their close readings. That is to say, there is no crossover
between what they assume elsewhere about
how biblical authors
and editors operated and the assumptions they bring to the act of
reading this or that story; those assumptions are imported from
their experience as ciritics of modern, Western literature. This
is indeed the “View from Nowhere,” or more precisely, the confusion
of two very different sets of assumptions.
Intentionally or otherwise, the literary approach has often ended
up playing an apologetic role in the debate about the Bible – and
it has also sometimes supported a basic confusion about the nature
of biblical texts and their genre.
[49]
On reflection, it does not seem to offer any more help than the
other apologetic tendencies surveyed.
Beyond Apologetics
The apologetic straddle is the direct result of trying to reconcile
two conflicting agendas and sets of purposes. The modern scholar’s
agenda calls for studying biblical texts in their historical and
cultural environment; the tradition of the Bible’s divine character
and its role in Bible-based religions have (or ought to have) no
operational significance in this agenda – and indeed, these items
are by and large not part of the discourse of biblical scholarship.
On the other hand, theologians and many ordinary readers often approach
the text with a commitment to having the Bible continue to occupy
its traditional place in their religions. They want it still to
be – in varying degrees, of course, and through different explicative
strategies – a divinely given text that speaks to us today, and
certainly one that is significantly different from other writings
from the ancient Near East.
[50]
Either agenda, it seems to me, can be pursued independently; it
is when they are combined that apologetics and “Biblical Criticism
Lite” ensue.
I believe that, after a period of confusion on this matter throughout
much of the twentieth century, a growing body of scholars has now
come to understand that these two agendas are indeed incompatible.
In writing
How to Read the Bible, all I attempted to add
to the current discussion was a detailed demonstration that this
is the case and the assertion that, moreover, the Bible was
from
the beginning understood to mean something quite different from
the apparent meaning of its various parts. This fact, exemplified
in hundreds of specific interpretations, might, it seems to me,
serve as a model for modern readers, encouraging them (again, in
varying degrees and through different explicative strategies) to
seek in the words of Scripture a message beyond that seen by the
modern critical eye. But it is certainly not my ambition to prescribe
a one-size-fits-all way of accomplishing this, nor – this should
go without saying – do I wish to assert that the only alternative
to the “original meaning” reading consists of those interpretations
found in the writings of the ancient interpreters.
Yet I do think those interpretations are important. They are, as
much as the words of the Bible itself, the common inheritance of
all modern Christians and Jews, “the rock from which you were hewn,
and the quarry from which you were dug.”
© 2007 by James Kugel
[1] B.
W. Anderson,
Understanding the Old Testament 4th edition
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1986), 164.
[2] G.
J. Wenham,
World Biblical Commentary vol 1: Genesis 1-15
(Waco, TX: Word Books, 1987), 164-65.
[3] K.
A. Mathews,
Genesis 1-11:26 (
The New American Commentary
vol. 1a), (Broadman & Holman, 1995), 339-40.
[4] G.
von Rad,
Genesis: A Commentary (OTL) ((Philadelphia:
Westminster, 1976), 124
[5] Similarly,
the claim in the previous passage cited to the effect that the
book of Genesis as a whole shows that “God is not inconvenienced
by human achievement” makes one wonder about the Tower of Babel
narrative. Wasn’t God disturbed in that story precisely because
“nothing that they [human beings] set out to do will be impossible
for them”?
[6] John
Skinner,
A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Genesis (International
Critical Commentary) (Edinburgh: T & T. Clark, 1910), 361.
[7] J.
H. Tullock,
The Old Testament Story (Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2000), p. 50
[8] C.
Westermann,
Genesis (London: T & T. Clark: 1987) 183.
[9] N.
Sarna,
Understanding Genesis (New York: Schocken, 1970)
183.
[10]
V. P. Hamilton,
The Book of Genesis Chapters 1-17 (Grand
Rapids: Eeerdmans, 1990), 383.
[11]
See also: Skinner,
Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Genesis,
248-49; W. J. Harrelson, ed.
The New Interpreter’s Study Bible
(Nashville: Abingdon, 2003), 29.
[12]
J. K. West,
Introduction to the Old Testament (New York:
Macmillan, 1981), 164.
[13]
R. D. Nelson,
Joshua: A Commentary (OTL) (Louisville: Westminster
John Knox, 1997) 47.
[14]
This idea goes back to Duhm; see the review of scholarship in
T. Mettinger,
A Farewell to the Servant Songs: A Critical Examination
of an Exegetical Axiom (Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1983), 1-15.
[15]
C. Westermann,
Isaiah 40-66: A Commentary (OTL) (Philadelphia:
Westminster, 1969), 92. Am I wrong to understand the intention
of the last sentence to be: “They are indeed separate, but that
does not mean they are the work of a mere editor or interpolator,
but the work of the authentic prophet, Deutero-Isaiah himself”?
[16]
A. Soggin,
Introduction to the Old Testament (London, 1976),
313; cited in Mettinger,
Farewell, 12.
[17]
It was denied by K. Budde, E. König, E. J. Kissane, N. H. Snaith,
and others; it is refuted in detail in Mettinger,
Farewell.
Charles Torrey put the case clearly in 1928: “But this view
of the [servant] passages as separate or separable is utterly
mistaken. They are not in any sense complete in themselves, nor
even possessed of characteristics not shared by the rest of the
book of which they form a part. To make them separate ‘poems’
of them is like selecting certain details of a great landscape-painter’s
masterpiece and styling each a ‘picture’”
The Second Isaiah:
A New Interpretation (New York: Scribners, 1928) 137.
[18]
Ibid., 46-47. Note also: “[Isa.] 52:13-53:12, after echoing clearly
traits from the earlier songs, unmistakably abandons the realm
of the biographical, on the basis of which we thought we could
understand what the servant’s office was, and gives a picture
of the true servant of YHWH which far transcends the personal
experience of the prophet. Thus it is not by chance or by ineptitude
that Isa. 53 has again and again been understood as alluding to
the figure of the one that is to come” –W. Zimmerli and J. Jeremias,
The Servant of God (London: SCM Press, 1965), 33.
[19]
Even the hard-headed Otto Eissfeldt asserted that modern scholarship
“has undoubtedly helped to pave the way for a deeper assessment
of the truth incorporate in the figure of the [“servant of the
Lord”], namely that vicarious suffering by the innocent is man’s
highest good, a truth which in Jesus’ suffering and death is made
a reality bringing salvation” (cited in R. Loewe, “Prolegomenon”
to S. R. Driver and A. Neubauer,
The Fifty-Third Chapter of
Isaiah According to the Jewish Interpreters (New York: KTAV,
1969). About the king prophecy in Isa. 11:1-9, Walter Brueggemann
writes: “Insofar as this text, with its clear messianic flavor,
can be drawn upon as an illumination of Jesus, it is a reminder
that Jesus cannot be reduced to privatistic salvation or to sacramental
operations, but that Jesus was received, celebrated, and eventually
crucified precisely for his embodiment and practice of this vision
of social possibility”
Isaiah 1-39 (Louisville: Westminster
John Knox, 1998), 101.
[20]
W. Brueggemann,
Isaiah 40-66 (Louisville: Westminster John
Knox, 1998), 141.
[21]
Westermann,
Isaiah 40-66, 93.
[22]
J. J. Collins,
Introduction to the Hebrew Bible (Minneapolis:
Fortress, 2004) 375.
[23]
A crucial step, as many scholars point out, was announced in the
inaugural lecture of Johann Philipp Gabler (1753-1826) at the
University of Altdorf on March 30, 1787, in which he distinguished
biblical theology from dogmatic theology. The latter, Gabler said,
consists of the effort of ordinary human beings – theologians
– to transmit theological truths as best they can for their own
age and their own schools or denominations; the former, by contrast,
has “a historical character, transmitting what the sacred writers
thought about divine matters.” Once this distinction had been
made, the
biblical theologian’s task came to be the assembling
the opinions of biblical writers on various concepts and ideas,
which should then be “carefully compared with one another.” Such
comparison, needless to say, was necessitated by the perception
that these sacred writers did not always agree with one another.
See G. Hasel,
Old Testament Theology: Basic Issues in the Debate
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972), 21-23.
[24]
James Barr has stated the matter with characteristic clarity:
“The character of theologies as organizations [of biblical material]
makes the working of scriptural authority more complicated. What
is the relation of these structures to the total body of scriptural
material? The common procedure seems to be thus: certain elements
in scripture are picked out and taken as essential framework for
the organization, which is then re-applied to the reading of the
scripture as a whole.” And again: “In this sense traditional orthodoxy
is a monumental example of ‘picking and choosing’ that it deprecates
in others” –
Holy Scripture: Canon, Authority, Criticism (Philadelphia:
Westminster, 1983), 39-40. See also J. J. Collins,
The Bible
After Babel: Historical Criticism in a Postmodern Age (Grand
Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2005), 132-42.
[25]
The notion of such a “center” (
Mitte) was made explicit
in W. Eichrodt’s promotion of covenant as the central concept
of the Old Testament, but its roots are deeper, identifiable even
in Spinoza’s assertion that it was only the items of which all
biblical books agree, such as monotheism or ideas about governance,
that had prescriptive value today. See Hasel,
OT Theology,
77-103. About this assumption Gerhard von Rad wrote: “What’s it
all about with this almost
unisono-asked question about
the ‘unity,’ the ‘center’ of the Old Testament? Is it something
so self-evident [that] its proof belongs, so to speak, as a
conditio
sine qua non to an orderly Old Testament theology?” (cited
in Collins,
Bible After Babel, 135). The answer is that
it is all about getting the Bible to continue having some theologically
valid teachings to offer despite its many now-unacceptable particulars.
[26]
This approach goes back to Spinoza, but was vigorously re-adopted
by the Jewish theologian Yehezkel Kaufman – not particularly convincingly,
as it turned out.
[27]
The roots of what was to become a major theme in twentieth century
Protestant neo-orthodoxy, the Bible as
Heilsgeschichte or
a “history of salvation,” can be traced back to the seventeenth
century; see Frei,
Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 46-47
,173-82.
In its later manifestation, however, it has introduced a fundamental
theological contradiction: see Langdon Gilkey’s essay on the theological
assumptions of G. Ernest Wright and other exponents of the “mighty
acts of God”: “Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Biblical
Language,”
Journal of Religion 41 (1961), 194-205. See
also R. Gnuse,
Heilsgeschichte as a Model for Biblical Theology
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1989); idem, “New Directions
in Biblical Theology: the Impact of Contemporary Scholarship in
the Hebrew Bible,”
JAAR 62 (1994),
893-918.
[28]
Bertil Albrektson,
History and the Gods: An Essay on the Idea
of Historical Events as Divine Manifestations in the Ancient Near
East and Israel (Lund: Gleerup, 1967) 1-122, played an important
role in overthrowing this conception, arguing for a fundamental
continuity in historical thinking between Israel and its ancient
Near Eastern neighbors.
[29]
A crucial milestone: B. Childs,
Biblical Theology in Crisis
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1970)
[30]
See the useful short survey by R. Gnuse,
The Authority of the
Bible: Theories of Inspiration, Revelation, and the Canon Of Scripture
(New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 14-65. Among other treatments,
I find particularly lucid P. J. Achtemeir,
The Inspiration
of Scripture: Problems and Proposals (Philadelphia: Westminster,
1980), revised and expanded as
Inspiration and Authority: the
Nature and Function of Christian Scripture (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson,
1999), especially 28-63. For a thoughtful evangelical perspective
on the question of inspiration: P. J. Enns,
Inspiration and
Incarnation: Evangelicals and the Problem of the Old Testament
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005).
[31]
See on this my articles, “’The Bible As Literature’ in Late Antiquity
and the Middle Ages,”
Hebrew University Studies in Literature
and the Arts 11 (1983), 20-69 and “Some Medieval and Renaissance
Writings on the Poetry of the Bible,” in I. Twersky,
Studies
in Medieval Jewish History and Literature (Cambridge: Harvard,
1979), 57-82. For these authors, there was no apparent conflict
between what they saw as the Bible’s use of tropes and figures
or classical meters and the attribution of its authorship to the
Holy Spirit. This attitude stands in contrast to that found in
rabbinical writings of the same period. See my
Idea of Biblical
Poetry, 96-170. Note also on this theme: Frances M. Young,
Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 49-96.
[32]
See on this my article, “On the Bible and Literary Criticism,”
Prooftexts 1 (1982), 217-36, and the subsequent exchange
with Adele Berlin in
Prooftexts 3 (1983), 323-32.
[33]
It was basically, I. A. Richards’ “New Criticism”
redivivus.
[34]
The hermeneutical side of this approach has been elaborated by
various modern figures (again, see chapter 36 and notes). The
biblical text is not (to use Saussure’s terminology) the
sign
or
signifier and the real events in Israel’s history
the
signified, since such an approach utterly separates
the things signified from the text itself – “The way we would
say, for example, that an exit sign in a theater indicates the
way to go but is not itself that way, nor part of that way. [But]
according to [the American philosopher Charles S. Peirce], some
signs… work this way, but verbal signs generally do not. Verbal
signs do not merely point away from themselves, and they do not
have merely one referent or object. Instead, he says, they are
genuine representations, or
symbols. This means that they
are signs that refer to some object or referent only with respect
to some mode of interpretation (or what he calls some
interpretant,
or interpreting agency or mind)… [Thus,] verbal signs normally
have more than one possible referent and… a given mode of interpretation
offers a means of distinguishing among a field of possible referents.”
(P. Ochs,
The Return to Scripture in Judaism and Christianity,
12-13.) In these terms, interpretation involves three elements,
signifier, signified, and interpretant. The
intrerpretant
of the Bible might thus be the approach of the “community of believers,”
whose reading of the signified might be very different from that
of a modern historian. By the same token, the interpretant might
be the literary reader, who says the signified in the Bible is
like the signified in
War and Peace or
David Copperfield.
(The difficulty with this, of course, is that these novels claim
to be novels, not an account of things that actually happened
on earth three thousand years ago, things that, if they are simply
viewed as fiction, lose some of their force as lessons about God’s
actual ways with humanity today. Even a book that seems to claim
to be history, such as Samuel Richardson’s epistolary novels
Pamela
[1740] or
Clarissa [1749], which present themselves as
actual letters, are easily distinguished from the claim of biblical
historians.)
[35]
Something similar happened with finding rhyme in the Bible. See
my .“The Influence of Moses ibn Habib’s
Darkhei No‘am”
B. D. Cooperman,
Jewish Thought in the Sixteenth Century
(Harvard University Press, 1983) 308-325.
[36]
I have argued this and related points in greater detail, and with
a number of examples, in my “On the Bible and Literary Criticism”;
my treatment of there here is therefore somewhat abbreviated.
See also M. Z. Brettler,
The Creation of History in Ancient
Israel (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 14-20.
[37]
Michael Drosnin,
The Bible Code (New York: Random House,
1998).
[38]
G. J. Wenham,
Genesis 1-15, 235.
[39]
Perhaps the best known practitioner of this sort of criticism
is J. P. Fokkelmann; see his
Narrative Art and Poetry in the
Books of Samuel (Assen: van Gorcum, 1981); also
Narrative
Art in Genesis: Specimens of Stylistic and Structural Analysis
(Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991). But he is certainly not alone,
nor is this approach limited to prose. The discoverers of infinitely
complicated metrical schemes, symmetry, chiasmus, and the like
have a distinguished pedigree (see my
Idea of Biblical Poetry,
esp. 204-251), but modern scholars (including Fokkelman
The
Major Poems of the Hebrew Bible at the Interface of Hermeneutics
and Structural Analysis) (Assen: van Gorcum, 1998) have not
been outstripped. An example of the same approach in Israeli
scholarship: Jacob Bazak
The Psalms in Sabbath Prayers: Their
Thought and Meaning in the Light of their Geometrical Structure
and Numerical Ornamentations (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Yavneh, 1985).
[40]
See on this the examination of such a diagram of Fokkelman’s in
my “On the Bible and Literary Criticism,”
Prooftexts 1
(1981), 224-25, and the subsequent “Controversy,” my exchange
with A. Berlin in
Prooftexts 2 (1982), 323-32.
[41]
A. Berlin,
Poetics and Interpretation of Biblical Narrative
(Sheffield: Almond Press, 1983), 154.
[43]
M. Buber and Rosenzweig,
Die Schrift und ihre Verdeutschung
(Berlin, 1936), 262-64.
[44]
Much of today’s literary criticism of the Bible is reminiscent
of other literary criticism, particularly in regard to matters
of technique or “poetics.” The operating assumption often seems
to be that biblical authors, like more modern ones, are interested
in showing how main characters change or evolve, that they like
to construct their poems and narratives in ways that are symmetrical
and pleasing to the eye, that they have a taste for irony, or
even that their works are to be analyzed in terms of such Western
genres as tragedy, comedy, or satire. Some of this may prove true
here or there, but it ought hardly to be assumed. For example,
there are very few poetic compositions in the Bible that might
be said to have recognizable stanzas delineated by some refrain,
although this form of poem was popular in ancient Greece and Rome
and has remained a mainstay of Western literature ever since.
One rare exception is Psalm 107, in which repeated lines do function
as a sort of refrain. But at what intervals? Not, as one might
expect, every four lines or every six, chopping the text into
regular blocks, but only here and there, at lines 8, 15, 21, and
31, creating “stanzas” of 8, 7, 6, and 10 lines respectively?
What does this say about the ancient Israelite love of symmetry?
Why is it that, in biblical poetry, one often finds in place of
exact repetition of a line or phrase – all poets supposedly love
this device! –
inexact repetition (compare, for example,
Ps. 24:7 and 24:9, or Ps. 122:3 with Ps. 122:4)? These and many
other particulars seem to support the notion that the whole idea
of reading the Bible “as literature” must be preceded by a rigorous
attempt to restore the “literary competence” of its readers. See
on this my “On the Bible and Literary Criticism.” John Barton,
Reading the Old Testament, also discusses the matter of
literary competence and the impact of structuralist poetics; see
pp. 8-19, 104-39, 180-97. Yet he seems somewhat divided on this
issue, arguing at one point that the modern literary critic of
the Bible is “simply clearing his mind of the prejudice (for it
is no more) that ancient authors did not operate within conventions
analogous to those of modern literature. Once the text is approached
with an open mind, evidence of literary patterning, of skilful
manipulation of theme and imagery, of dovetailing of disparate
sources simply springs from the page” (53). But see below.
[45]
Borrowed from the title, and some of the argument, of Thomas Nagel’s
The View From Nowhere (New York: Oxford, 1986).
[46]
See Robert Alter,
The Art of Biblical Narrative (New York:
Basic, 1981), 6-10; J. D. Levenson,
The Death and Resurrection
of the Beloved Son, 157-62.
[47]
Levenson,
Death and Resurrection, 158.
[48]
It is reprinted in Wimsatt,
The Verbal Icon (Lexington:
University of Kentucky, 1954).
[49]
The point was made long ago: “Rabbi Simeon said: Woe to him who
regards the Torah as a book of mere tales and profane matters.
If this were so, we ourselves might write a Torah nowadays that
deals in such matters and [it might be] even more excellent. Indeed,
in regard to earthly matters, the kings and princes of the world
already possess materials of greater value. We could use them
as a model for composing a Torah of this kind. But in reality
the words of the Torah are higher words and higher mysteries…The
tales of the Torah are only her outward clothing. If anyone thinks
that the Torah itself is this clothing and nothing more, he might
as well be dead. Such a person can have no share in the world
to come. That is why David said, ‘Open my eyes so that I may behold
wondrous things out of Your Torah’ [Ps. 119:18], namely, that
which underlies the Torah’s outer clothing” (
Zohar III,
152a, cited in G. Scholem,
On the Kabbalah and its Symbolism
[New York: Schocken, 1969], 63-64). Note also the thoughtful
remarks of James Barr,
The Bible in the Modern World (London:
SCM Press, 1973), 53-74.
[50]
In my opinion, even literary critics of the Bible are caught between
the same two conflicting programs; even if saving the Bible from
the clutches of “excavative” scholarship (Alter) is not part of
their announced aim, I think it would be naive to suppose that
their own interest in the subject, or the interest of others in
their work, is entirely divorced from the Bible’s traditional
role in Judaism and Christianity.